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Abstract— This paper studies the reliability of a real-world
learning-enabled system, which conducts dynamic vehicle track-
ing based on a high-resolution wide-area motion imagery input.
The system consists of multiple neural network components –
to process the imagery inputs – and multiple symbolic (Kalman
filter) components – to analyse the processed information for
vehicle tracking. It is known that neural networks suffer
from adversarial examples, which make them lack robustness.
However, it is unclear if and how the adversarial examples
over learning components can affect the overall system-level
reliability. By integrating a coverage-guided neural network
testing tool, DeepConcolic, with the vehicle tracking system,
we found that (1) the overall system can be resilient to
some adversarial examples thanks to the existence of other
components, and (2) the overall system presents an extra level of
uncertainty which cannot be determined by analysing the deep
learning components only. This research suggests the need for
novel verification and validation methods for learning-enabled
systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wide-scale deployment of Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) in safety-critical applications, such as self-driving
cars, healthcare and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), in-
creases the demand for tools that can test, validate, verify, and
ultimately certify such systems [1]. Normally, autonomous
systems, or more specifically learning-enabled systems, con-
tain both data-driven learning components and model-based
non-learning components [2], and a certification needs to
consider both categories of components, and the system as a
whole.
Structural code coverage combined with requirements
coverage has been the primary approach for measuring
test completeness as assurance evidence to support safety
arguments, for the certification of safety-critical software.
Testing techniques for machine learning components, pri-
marily DNNs, are comparatively new and have only been
actively developed in the past few years, e.g., [3], [4].
Unlike model-based software systems, DNNs are usually
considered as black boxes, and therefore it is difficult to
understand their behaviour by means of inspection. In [5], we
developed a tool, DeepConcolic, to work with a number
of extensions to the MC/DC coverage metric, targeting
DNNs. The MC/DC coverage metric [6] is recommended
in a number of certification documents and standards, such
as RTCA’s DO-178C and ISO26262, for the development
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of safety critical software. Its extension to DNN testing has
been shown to be successful in testing DNNs by utilising
white-box testing methods, i.e., by exercising the known
structure with the parameters of a DNN to gather assurance
evidence. It is, however, unclear whether such a testing
tool can still be effective when working with learning-
enabled systems containing both learning and model-based
components. Primarily, we want to understand the following
two research questions:
Q1 Can the system as a whole be resilient against the deficits
discovered over the learning components?
Q2 Is there new uncertainty needed to be considered in terms
of the interaction between learning and non-learning
components?
The key motivation for considering Q1 is to understand
whether, when generating a test suite, a DNN testing tool
needs to consider the existence of other components in order
to assess the safety of the system. The key motivation for
considering Q2 is to understand whether a DNN testing
tool can take advantage of the uncertainty presented in the
interaction between learning and non-learning components in
generating test cases.
Specifically, for the learning-enabled systems, we consider
in this paper a tracking system in Wide Area Motion Imagery
(WAMI) [7], where the vehicle detection is implemented
by a few DNNs and the tracking is implemented with a
Kalman filter based method. Using this system, we consider
its reliability when running in an adversarial environment,
where an adversary can have limited access to the system by
intercepting the inputs to the perception unit.
Our experiments provide affirmative answers to the above
research questions and point out the urgent need to develop
system-level testing tools to support the certification of
learning-enabled systems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A (feedforward and deep) neural network N is a function
that maps an input x to an output. According to the tasks,
the output can be of different format. For example, for
classification task, the DNN computes a label, which is
denoted by N (x).label .
Adversarial examples [8] are two very similar inputs with
different labels. The existence of such pairs has been used
as a proxy metric for the training quality of a DNN. Given
an input x1 that is correctly labeled by a DNN N , another
input x2 is said to be an adversarial example if x1 and x2
are “close enough”, i.e., ||x1−x2||p ≤ , and N (x1).label 6=
N (x2).label . Here, p denotes the Lp-norm distance metric
and  measures the term “sufficiently small”.
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A number of algorithms have been proposed to find
adversarial examples. However, such methods are not able
to quantify progress, and thus, are not useful as a stopping
condition for testing a DNN. This has motivated the coverage
criteria recently developed for DNNs.
A. The DeepConcolic Tool
Several structural coverage criteria have been designed
for DNNs, including neuron coverage [3] and its exten-
sions [9], and variants of Multiple Condition/Decision Cover-
age (MC/DC) for DNNs [10]. These coverage criteria quantify
the exhaustiveness of a test suite for a DNN. Neuron coverage
requires that, for every neuron in the network, there must
exist at least one test case in the generated test suite that
lifts its activation value above some threshold; the criteria
in [9] generalise the neuron coverage from a single neuron
to a set of neurons. The MC/DC variants for DNNs capture
the fact that a (decision) feature (a set of neurons) in a layer
is directly decided by its connected (condition) features in
the previous layer, and thus require test conditions such that
every condition feature must be exhibited regardless of its
effect on the decision feature.
DeepConcolic1 implements a concolic analysis that exam-
ines the set of behaviors of a DNN, and is able to identify
potentially problematic input/output pairs. DeepConcolic
generates test cases and adversarial examples for DNNs
following the specified test conditions. Developers can use
the test results to compare different DNN models, and the
adversarial examples can be used to improve and re-train the
DNN or develop an adversarial example mitigation strategy.
Moreover, a major safety challenge for the use of DNNs is
due to the lack of understanding about how a decision is
made by a DNN. The DeepConcolic tool is able to test each
particular component of a DNN, and this aids human analysis
of the internal structures of a DNN. By understanding these
structures, we improve the confidence in DNN behaviour;
this is different from providing guarantees (for example [11],
[12], [13], [14], [15]), just as testing conventional software
does not provide guarantees of correctness.
III. DETECTION FROM WIDE-AREA MOTION IMAGERY
This section describes the technical details of a tracking
system. The tracking system requires continuous imagery
input from e.g., airborne high-resolution cameras. The input
to the tracking system is a video, which consists of a finite
sequence of images. Each image contains a number of
vehicles. Similar to [7], we use the WPAFB 2009 [16] dataset.
The images were taken by a camera system with six optical
sensors that had already been stitched to cover a wide area
of around 35 km2. The frame rate is 1.25Hz. This dataset
includes 1025 frames, which is around 13 minutes of video.
It is divided into training video (512 frames) and testing
video (513 frames). All the vehicles and their trajectories
are manually annotated. There are multiple resolutions of
videos in the dataset. For the experiment, we chose to use
1https://github.com/TrustAI/DeepConcolic
the 12,000×10,000 images, in which the size of vehicles is
smaller than 10×10 pixels. We use αi to denote the i-th frame
and αi(x, y) the pixel on the intersection of x-th column and
y-th row of αi.
In the following, we explain how the tracking system works
by having a video as input. In general, this is done in two
steps: detection and tracking. In Section III-A through to
Section III-D, we explain the detection steps, i.e., how to
detect a vehicle with CNN-based perception units. This is
followed by the tracking step in Section III-E.
A. Background Construction
Vehicle detection in WAMI video is a challenging task
due to the lack of vehicle appearances and the existence
of frequent pixel noises. It has been discussed in [17], [18]
that an appearance-based object detector may cause a large
number of false alarms. For this reason, in this paper, we
only consider detecting moving objects for tracking.
Background construction is a fundamental step in extracting
pixel changes from the input image. The background is built
for the current environment from a number of previous frames
that were captured by a moving camera system. It proceeds
in the following steps.
a) Image registration: is to compensate for the camera
motion by aligning all the previous frames to the current
frame. The key is to estimate a transformation matrix, ht−kt ,
which transforms frame αt−k to frame αt using a given
transformation function. For the transformation function, we
consider projective transformation (or homography), which
has been widely applied in multi-perspective geometry, an
area where WAMI camera systems are already utilised.
The estimation of ht−kt is generated by applying feature-
based approaches. First of all, feature points from images
at frame αt−k and αt, respectively, are extracted by feature
detectors (e.g., Harris corner or SIFT-like [19] approaches).
Second, feature descriptors, such as SURF [20] and ORB [21]
are computed for all detected feature points. Finally, pairs
of corresponding feature points between two images can be
identified and the matrix ht−kt can be estimated by using
RANSAC [22] which is robust against outliers.
b) Background Modeling: We generate the background,
Ibgt , for each time t, by computing the median image of the
L previously-aligned frames, i.e.,
Ibgt (x, y) =
1
L
L∑
i=1
αt−i(x, y) (1)
In our experiments, we take either L = 4 or L = 5.
Note that, to align the L previous frames to the newly
received frame, only one image registration process is
performed. After obtaining the matrices ht−2t−1, h
t−3
t−1, ... by
processing previous frames, we perform image registration
once to get ht−1t , and then let
ht−2t = h
t−1
t × ht−2t−1, ht−3t = ht−1t × ht−3t−1. (2)
c) Extraction of Potential Moving Objects: By compar-
ing the difference between Ibgt and the current frame αt, we
can extract a set Qbc of potential moving objects by first
computing the following set of pixels
Pbc = {(x, y) | |Ibgt (x, y)−αt(x, y)| > δbc, (x, y) ∈ Γ} (3)
and then applying image morphology operation on Pbc, where
Γ is the set of pixels and δbc is a threshold value to determine
which pixels should be considered.
B. CNN for Detection Refinement
After obtaining Pbc, we develop a Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) Ndr, a type of DNN, to detect vehicles.
We highlight a few design decisions. The major causes
of false alarms generated by the background subtraction
are: poor image registration, light changes and the apparent
displacement of high objects (e.g., buildings and trees)
caused by parallax. We emphasise that the objects of interest
(e.g., vehicles) mostly, but not exclusively, appear on roads.
Moreover, we perceive that a moving object generates a
temporal pattern (e.g., a track) that can be exploited to discern
whether or not a detection is an object of interest. Thus, in
addition to the shape of the vehicle in the current frame, we
assert that the historical context of the same place can help
to distinguish the objects of interest and false alarms.
By the above observations, we create a binary classification
CNN Ndr : R21×21×(N+1) −→ {0, 1} to predict whether a
21×21 pixels window contains a moving object given aligned
image patches generated from the previous N frames. The
21× 21 pixels window is identified by considering the image
patches from the set Qbc. We suggest N = 3 in this paper,
as it is the maximum time for a vehicle to cross the window.
The input to the CNN is a 21 × 21 × (N + 1) matrix and
the convolutional layers are identical to the traditional 2D
CNNs except that the three colour channels are substituted
with N + 1 grey-level frames.
Essentially, Ndr acts as a filter to remove from Qbc objects
that are unlikely to be vehicles. Let Qdr be the obtained set
of moving objects. If the size of an image patch in Qdr is
similar to a vehicle, we directly label it as a vehicle. On the
other hand, if the size of the image patch in Qdr is larger than
a vehicle, i.e., there may be multiple vehicles, we pass this
image patch to the location prediction for further processing.
C. CNN for Location Prediction
We take a regression CNN Nlp : R45×45×(N+1) −→ R15×15
to process image patches passed over from the detection
refinement phase. As in [18], a regression CNN can predict
the locations of objects given spatial and temporal information.
The input to Nlp is similar to the classification CNN Ndr
described in Section III-B, except that the size of the window
is enlarged to 45×45. The output of Nlp is a 225-dimensional
vector, equivalent to a down-sampled image (15 × 15) for
reducing computational cost.
For each 15× 15 image, we apply a filter to obtain those
pixels whose values are greater than not only a threshold
value δlp but also the values of its adjacent pixels. We then
obtain another 15× 15 image with a few bright pixels, each
of which is labelled as a vehicle. Let O be the set of moving
objects updated from Qdr after applying location prediction.
D. Detection Framework
The processing chain of the detector is shown in Figure 1(a).
At the beginning of the video, the detector takes the first
L frames to construct the background, thus the detections
from frame L + 1 can be generated. After the detection
process finishes in each iteration, it is added to the template
of previous frames. The updating process substitutes the
oldest frame with the input frame. This is to ensure that
the background always considers the latest scene, since the
frame rate is usually low in WAMI videos such that parallax
effects and light changes can be pronounced. As we wish
to detect very small and unclear vehicles, we apply a small
background subtraction threshold and a minimum blob size.
This, therefore, leads to a huge number of potential blobs.
The classification CNN is used to accept a number of blobs.
As mentioned in Section III-B, the CNN only predicts if
the window contains a moving object or not. According to
our experiments, the cases where multiple blobs belong to
one vehicle and one blob includes multiple vehicles, occur
frequently. Thus, we design two corresponding scenarios:
the blob is very close to another blob(s); the size of the
blob is larger than 20 × 20. If any blob follows either of
the two scenarios, we do not consider the blob for output.
The regression CNN (Section III-C) is performed on these
scenarios to predict the locations of the vehicles in the
corresponding region, and a default blob will be given. If the
blob does not follow any of the scenarios, this blob will be
outputted directly as a detection. Finally, the detected vehicles
include the output of both sets.
E. Object Tracking
1) Problem Statement: We consider a single target tracker
(ie. Kalman filter) to track a vehicle given all the detection
points over time in the field of view. The track is initialised
by manually giving a starting point and a zero initial velocity,
such that the state vector is defined as st = [xt, yt, 0, 0]T
where [xt, yt] is the coordinate of the starting point. We define
the initial covariance of the target, P = diag [30, 30, 20, 20]2,
which is the initial uncertainty of the target’s state2.
A near-constant velocity model is applied as the dynamic
model in the Kalman filter which is defined in (4).
st|t−1 = F · st−1 + ωt s.t. F =
[
I2×2 I2×2
O2×2 I2×2
]
(4)
where I is a identity matrix, O is a zero matrix, st−1 is
the state vector in previous timestep, st|t−1 is the predicted
state vector and ωt is the process noise which can be further
defined as ωt ∼ N (0, Q), where N (0, Q) denotes a Gaussian
2With this configuration it is not necessary for the starting point to be a
precise position of a vehicle, and the tracker will find a proximate target to
track on. However, it is possible to define a specific velocity and reduce the
uncertainty in P , so the tracker can track a particular target.
Fig. 1: (a) The architecture of the vehicle detector. (b) Workflow for testing the WAMI tracking system.
distribution whose mean is zero and the covariance is Q
defined in (5).
Q = σ2q ·
 13dt3 · I2×2 12dt2 · I2×2
1
2dt
2 · I2×2 I2×2
 (5)
where dt is the time interval between two frames and σq
is a configurable constant. σq = 3 is suggested for the
aforementioned WAMI video.
Next, we define the measurement model as (6).
zt = H · st + t s.t. H =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
(6)
where zt is the measurement (which is the position of the
tracked vehicle), st denotes the true state of the vehicle and
t ∼ N (0, R) denotes the measurement noise which models
the uncertainty involved in the detection process. R is defined
as R = σ2r · I2×2, where we suggest σr = 5 for the WAMI
video.
Since the camera system is moving, the position should be
compensated for such motion using the identical transforma-
tion function for image registration. However, we ignore the
influence to the velocity as it is relatively small, but consider
integrating this into the process noise.
2) Measurement Association: During the update step of the
Kalman filter, the residual measurement should be calculated
by subtracting the measurement (zt) from the predicted state
(st|t−1). In the tracking system, the gated nearest neighbour to
obtain the measurement from a set of detections is considered.
K-nearest neighbour is firstly applied to find the nearest
detection, zˆt, of the predicted measurement, H · st|t−1. Then
the Mahalanobis distance between zˆt and H · st|t−1 is
calculated as follows:
Dt =
√
(zˆt −H · st|t−1)T · P−1t|t−1 · (zˆt −H · st|t−1) (7)
where Pt|t−1 is the Innovation covariance, which is defined
within Kalman filter.
A potential measurement is adopted if Dt ≤ g with g = 2
in our experiment. If there is no available measurement, the
update step will not be performed and the state uncertainty
accumulates. It can be noticed that a large covariance leads
to a large search window. Because the search window can
be unreasonably large, we halt the tracking process when
the trace of the covariance matrix exceeds a pre-determined
value.
IV. RELIABILITY TESTING FRAMEWORK
We consider the reliability of the vehicle tracking system
introduced above when its perception units are subject to
adversarial attacks. In general, we assume that the vehicle
tracking system is running in an adversarial environment and
the adversary is able to intercept the inputs to the perception
unit in a limited way.
Figure 1(b) outlines the workflow of our testing framework,
where DeepConcolic is deployed for reliability testing of the
vehicle tracking system. Inside the dashed block, resides the
workflow of the original WAMI tracking system as described
in Section III. In order to test the reliability of this vehicle
tracker, we interface it with DeepConcolic, which accepts as
inputs the original WAMI image inputs and the convolutional
network. It then generates the distortion, via MC/DC testing,
for the input image to lead the network into failing to detect
vehicles.
A. Tracks
First of all, we formalise the concept of a track implemented
in the WAMI tracker. At each step (frame), every detected
vehicle can be identified with a location, represented as a
tuple, l = (x, y), where x and y are the location’s horizontal
and vertical coordinates.
Given two locations l1 = (x1, y1) and l2 = (x2, y2), we
assume that there is a distance function distloc(l1, l2) to
quantify the distance between the two detected locations. For
example, we can define the distance function as follows.
distloc(l1, l2) =
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2
In reality, when tracking a car, it is reasonable to assume a
threshold  such that as long as the distance between two
locations does not exceed , i.e., distloc(l1, l2) ≤ , the two
locations l1 and l2 can be regarded as the same.
A detected track, denoted by ~r, consists of a sequence of
locations such that ~r = l1 . . . ln, where n is the total number
of steps for tracking. We write the number of steps |~r| as
the length of the track. Let R be the set of finite tracks.
Subsequently, given two tracks ~r1 and ~r2 of the same length,
there are multiple choices to measure the difference between
the two, denoted by disttr(~r1, ~r2), including
distsumtr (~r1, ~r2) =
∑
1≤i≤n distloc(l1,i, l2,i)
distmeantr (~r1, ~r2) =
1
n · distsum(~r1, ~r2)
distmaxtr (~r1, ~r2) = max1≤i≤n{distloc(l1,i, l2,i)}
disttr(~r1, ~r2) = | {distloc(l1,i, l2,i) > |1 ≤ i ≤ n}|
αk+1 αk+2
Qk+1
lk, Ck lk+1, Ck+1lˆk+1
Before Robustness Testing
αk+1 αk+2
Qk+1
lk, Ck lk+1, Ck+1lˆk+1
Q′k+1
After Robustness Testing
Fig. 2: Illustration of the dependencies and workflows between
data, for the cases of before robustness testing (Left) and
after robustness testing (Right), respectively.
where lm,i represents the i-th location on the track ~rm. Intu-
itively, distsumtr (~r1, ~r2) expresses the accumulated distance
between locations of two tracks, distmeantr (~r1, ~r2) is the aver-
age distance between locations of two tracks, distmaxtr (~r1, ~r2)
highlights the largest distance between locations of two tracks,
and disttr(~r1, ~r2) counts the number of steps on which the
distance between locations of two tracks is greater than .
B. Reliability Definition
We start from explaining how to obtain a track by the
WAMI detector in Section III. Given a number n, we let Xn
be the set of image sequences of length n. For each image
sequence α1 . . . αn ∈ Xn, the WAMI tracking system maps
it into a track as follows. Let αk+1 be the (k + 1)-th image
and sk = (lk,Ck) the state of the Kalman filter after k steps,
where lk is the location, and Ck is the covariance matrix
representing the uncertainty of lk. From sk, an estimated
location lˆk+1 can be obtained. Moreover, from the image
αk+1, by the WAMI detection based on both Ndr and Nlp in
Section III, we can have a set of locations Qk+1 representing
the detected moving objects. By selecting a location qk+1 ∈
Qk+1 which is closest to lˆk+1, we determine the next location
lk+1, and use this information to update Ck into Ck+1. In
the left of Figure 2, the causality between the above entities
is exhibited. For simplicity, we can write the resulting track
as
~r = G(α1...αn) = l1...ln (8)
Because of the existence of the adversary, when the
detection components Ndr and Nlp lack robustness, from
αk+1 we may have a different set, Q′k+1, of detected moving
objects. Therefore, there may be a different q′k+1 6= qk+1,
which will in turn lead to different l′k+1 and C
′
k+1. The
causality of these entities is exhibited in the right of Figure 2.
We write the resulting track as
~r′ = (adv G)(α1...αn) = l′1...l′n (9)
Therefore, given a track ~r, by attacking the learning
components of the tracking system, another track ~r′ may
be returned. Now, we can define the reliability of a tracking
system. The reliability of a tracking system over an image
sequence, α1...αn, a function, disttr, and a threshold, E, is
defined as the non-existence of an adversary, adv, such that
disttr(G(α1...αn), (adv G)(α1...αn)) > E. (10)
when ||α1...αn − adv(α1...αn)||p ≤ 0, with 0 > 0
being a small enough real number. We use ||α1...αn −
adv(α1...αn)||p ≤ 0 to denote that the maximum adversarial
perturbation to be considered is no more than 0, when mea-
sured with Lp-norm. Under such a constraint, the reliability
requirement is to ensure that no adversary can produce an
attack that results in the attacked track significantly deviat-
ing from the original track, i.e., disttr(G(α1...αn), (adv 
G)(α1...αn)) > E.
C. Reliability Validation
We use DeepConcolic generated test cases for the detection
components Ndr and Nlp to validate the reliability of the
tracking system. In theory, we may generate test cases for
all steps k > 1 or a few randomly selected steps. In practice,
we found that the tracking system in Figure 1 (b) is more
sensitive to the scheme when there are consecutive missing
detections of the vehicle.
Thus, we design the testing scheme Test(s, k) to test the
tracking system, that is, starting from the s-th frame, test
cases are generated by applying DeepConcolic to k successive
frames for the tracking system. A track comprises of a finite
sequence of vehicle detection, and Test(s, k) is useful to
access the reliability of different parts of the track. This helps
reveal the potential vulnerabilities of the tracking system.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We sample a number of tracks with maximum length of 30,
and then apply the Test(s, k) with a variety of configurations:
s ∈ [5, 20], k ∈ [1, 4]. Example tracks are as in Figure 3.
Fig. 3: Original detected tracks from the tracking system
At first, we confirm that even by only testing the deep
learning component in the tracking system, it is able to find
test inputs that help discover the vulnerabilities in the tracking.
Figure 4 shows the adversarial tracks found by the testing.
Furthermore, different parts of the same track exhibit
different levels of robustness. For example, as shown in
Fig. 4: Distorted tracks found by DeepConcolic testing
Figure 5, the frames x5, x6 are less robust than x11, x12, as
the testing result, from the latter, results in less deviation
from the original track; such information provides insight to
evaluate and improve the tracking system.
Meanwhile, we also observe that by only testing the deep
learning component it may not be sufficient to mislead the
overall tracking system. As in Figure 5, the tracking finally
converges to the original one. This is due to compensation
provided by other components in the system, and it answers
the research question, Q1, that the tracking system is resilient
to some extent towards the deficits of a learning component.
Test(5, 2) Test(11, 2)
Fig. 5: Adversarial tracks (red) after testing different parts of
the original track (green)
Finally, changing more frames does not necessarily result
in larger deviation from the original track. This is demon-
strated as in Figure 6, where a larger distance between the
original and adversarial tracks is found when testing frames
x9, x10, instead of x9, x10, x11. This observation reflects the
uncertainty from other components (other than the CNNs) in
the tracking system, as specified in research question Q2.
Test(9, 2) Test(9, 3)
Fig. 6: Adversarial tracks from testing different numbers of
consecutive frames starting from x9
VI. RELATED WORKS
Verification of DNNs from software testing perspective has
been a popular direction [5], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28],
[29], [30], [31], [32], [33], see [1] for a survey with other
perspectives such as formal verification and interpretability.
Autonomous driving has been the primary application domain
for assessments of DNN testing techniques [34], [35], [36],
[37]. The analysis in [34], [35] comprises an image generator
that produces synthetic pictures for testing neural networks
used in classification of cars in autonomous vehicles. In
[36], a 3D simulator is proposed to test the dynamics of the
pedestrians and the agent vehicles (including simple dynamics
for suspension, tyres, etc.), in the virtual environment of the
system under test. In [37], a technique is presented to reason
about the safety of a closed-loop, learning-enabled control
system. Research is also conducted on the verification of
cognitive trust between human and autonomous systems [38].
We note that there is limited work focussed on the
verification of learning-enabled systems such as the one
highlighted in this work.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we show that solely testing the correctness
of deep learning components in a vehicle tracking system in
isolation is insufficient, since either a deficit discovered in
the learning component may be suppressed by the existence
of other components, or that there are new uncertainties
introduced due to the interaction between learning and non-
learning components. Similar results are also observed for
the connections between LSTM and CNN layers [39]. These
results clearly indicate the necessity of developing a testing
strategy that addresses learning components in isolation, as
well as in combination with other components within a wider
system-level testing framework for learning-enabled systems.
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